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Introduction
It is said that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. In
the wake of the horrendous events of September 11, 2001 and the ensuing
hunt for Osama bin Laden, as well as the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict and the U.S.-led war on Iraq, one can hardly dismiss the importance of
an international agreement on just what is meant by "terrorism."
This essay examines the current status quo of terrorism and the vari-
ous interpretations (and misinterpretations) thereof in Part I, the legal mea-
sures that are currently in place to combat terrorism in Part II, and the
need to forge a definition that clearly includes all forms of terrorism,
including state terrorism in Part III.
I. Defining Terrorism: Political, Legal, Interpretations,
Misinterpretations
There is no general consensus on the definition of terrorism. The dif-
ficulty of defining terrorism lies in the risk it entails of taking positions.
The political value of the term currently prevails over its legal one. Left to
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its political meaning, terrorism easily falls prey to change that suits the
interests of particular states at particular times. The Taliban and Osama
bin Laden were once called freedom fighters (mujahideen) and backed by
the CIA when they were resisting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
Now they are on top of the international terrorist lists. Today, the United
Nations views Palestinians as freedom fighters, struggling against the
unlawful occupation of their land by Israel, and engaged in a long-estab-
lished legitimate resistance, yet Israel regards them as terrorists. Israel'
also brands the Hizbullah of Lebanon as a terrorist group, whereas most of
the international community regards it as a legitimate resistance group,
fighting Israel's occupation of Southern Lebanon. In fact, the successful
ousting of Israeli forces from most of the South by the Hizbollah in 2000
made Lebanon the only Arab country to actually defeat the Israeli army.
The repercussion of the current preponderance of the political over the
legal value of terrorism is costly, leaving the war against terrorism selective,
incomplete and ineffective. 2 But the need to forge a universally agreed defi-
nition of terrorism is more than just a desirable political endeavor. It is
also a legal undertaking prescribed by U.N. General Assembly Resolution
42/159 of December 7, 1987, which recognizes that "the effectiveness of
the struggle against terrorism could be enhanced by the establishment of a
generally agreed definition of international terrorism." In fact only a legal,
internationally agreed upon definition of terrorism can be afforded consis-
tent application because its legal character gives it permanence, universal-
ity and comprehensiveness.
Above all there is the need to provide evidentiary proof of the actual
(not alleged) terrorist activity of a group in order to avoid politically moti-
vated abuse of the term to justify state terrorism under the excuse of "fight-
ing terrorism." A definition of terrorism should be comprehensive in order
to avoid double standards, and it should encompass all forms of the act,
irrespective of the perpetrator, actor, target, place or time. It should also
distinguish between terrorism and the legitimate right to resist occupa-
tion. 3 Many of the organizations deemed terrorists today may use terrorist
methods but their motives may well be legitimate. The confusion between
terrorism and resistance is caused by a skewed definition of terrorism that
1. Since June 2003, three states, namely Canada, the United States, and Australia
also view the Hizbollah as a terrorist group.
2. Terrorism comes in two forms. In its instrumental form, hostage-taking, the
value of the hostage is maximized and used as a tool to reach clear objectives. In it
expressive form, terrorism is conducted by actors who may simply be venting off hate,
anger or desire for revenge, rather than to realize clearly defined premeditated ends. The
interest of the distinction lies in that negotiation is only possible in the former case,
whereas in the latter the objective of the terrorists is reached and there is no intention to
negotiate.
3. Some conventions make that distinction, for example the Preamble and Article
12 of the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (17 December 1979).
Similarly, Article 19 of the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings (15 December 1997) and Article 21 of the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (9 December 1999) refer to the UN princi-
ples, which include of course the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination.
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emphasizes non-state actors and downplays state terrorism. Thus the then-
newly appointed U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Satterfield
once labeled as a "terrorist" act the Intifada, which is the internationally
recognized legitimate Palestinian popular resistance to the illegitimate
Israeli occupation. As we shall see later, terrorism is not necessarily vio-
lence against a government, and is certainly not to be confused with gue-
rilla warfare and riots.
II. The Existing Legal Protection
Despite the lack of a consensus on the meaning of the term, interna-
tional law provides several means of legal protection against terrorism.
There is clear condemnation of terrorism (and terrorist attacks) by the
International Court of Justice. There are at least twelve United Nations
conventions against terrorism. Often cited are Security Council Resolu-
tions 1373 of September 2001 and 1269 of October 1999, which both
denounce "all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and
unjustified, regardless of their motivation." The International Criminal
Court Statute of 1998 in Article 7 describes crimes against humanity as
acts "committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack." The nature
of terrorist acts is such that they can be included in this category. In Arti-
cle 8 the statute also describes war crimes as grave violations against per-
sons and property protected by the terms of the Geneva conventions,
which govern during occupation. The nature of terrorist acts committed
during a military aggression puts them under this category.
Furthermore, the U.N. Charter Articles 1.2, 51 and 55 prohibits states
from violating the right of peoples to self-determination for any reason,
and it urges them to refrain from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state. In Article 103 it
also notes the cancellation of any international agreement that breaches or
does not implement this right. Hence, terrorism should not be equated
with the legitimate, internationally protected right of peoples to self-deter-
mination. To resist occupation is to end the highest form of terrorism,
namely, state terrorism. For example, Israel's occupation and partial
annexation of lands conquered in 1967 is a violation of international law,
specifically Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which urge it to
end its illegal occupation of Arab territories. Thus, the struggle of Pales-
tinians is as legitimate as the American War of Independence and the
French Revolution. The same applies to Israel's illegal occupation of South
Lebanon for more than two decades, and its continued occupation of the
Lebanese Shebaa Farms. As long as the totality of Lebanese territory has
not been liberated, the Lebanese resistance to the Israeli occupation will
thus remain a legitimate right in accordance with international law.
The Final Document of the thirteenth (latest) Summit of the Non-
Aligned Movement (of which Lebanon is a member) reiterated that "terror-
ism cannot be attributed to religion, nationality, or civilization." It also
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made a very important distinction. On the one hand, it reaffirmed that
"criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the
general public, a group of persons or particular persons for whatever pur-
poses, wherever and by whomever committed are, in any circumstance,
unjustifiable, whatever the considerations or factors that may be invoked to
justify them." On the other hand, it "rejected certain attempts to equate the
legitimate struggle of peoples under colonial or alien domination and for-
eign occupation, for self-determination and national liberation with terror-
ism in order to prolong occupation and oppression." In one of its strongest
articles, the document states its total rejection of the unilateral preparation
by "a certain State" of a list that "accus[es] countries of allegedly support-
ing terrorism." It deemed such actions as constituting "a form of psycho-
logical and political terrorism."
The General Assembly has adopted at least three resolutions of rele-
vance to the issue of terrorism. 4 Resolution 42/159 of December 7, 1987
condemns international terrorism but also reaffirms "the principle of the
self-determination of peoples as enshrined in the charter of the United
Nations," and it deems legitimate the movements of "peoples under colo-
nial and racist regimes and other forms of alien domination." Further-
more, Resolution 39/159 of December 17, 1984, evokes the
"inadmissibility of the policy of state terrorism and any actions by states
aimed at undermining the socio-political system in other sovereign states"
and reaffirms "the obligation of all states to refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence of any State," and "resolutely con-
demns policies and practices of terrorism in relations between states as a
method of dealing with other states and people." It demands that "all
States take no actions aimed at military intervention and occupation, forci-
ble change in or undermining of the socio-political system of States,
destabilization and overthrow of their Governments, and, in particular, ini-
tiate no military action to that end under any pretext whatsoever and cease
forthwith any such action already in progress." The same resolution also
reaffirms the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination, just as
Resolution 44/29 of December 4, 1989 on "measures to prevent interna-
tional terrorism" which in addition unequivocally condemns as "criminal
and unjustifiable" all acts, methods and practices of terrorism, "wherever
and by whomever committed." As such, no one is above the law, whether
state or non-state actors, and this is even more important in combating
terrorism.
III. The Missing Link: State Terrorism
Examples of this practice include the Lockerbie incident, the support
extended to Osama bin Laden by the Taliban regime, and the daily Israeli
4. See also Resolutions 54/110 and 55/158. Similarly, one can find some elements
of a "definition" of terrorism in resolutions 54/110, 55/158 and 57/567, which refer to
the state of terror and the motivation behind terrorist acts deemed inexcusable.
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assaults on the Palestinian and other Arab populations. International law
does not (and should not) distinguish between state and non-state actors
when it comes to terrorist acts. During the Cold War, both the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R. gave secret support (directly or otherwise) to revolutionary
movements seeking to overthrow regimes on their respective opposite sides.
State terrorism is the unlawful use of violence or repression perpetrated or
sponsored by a state against some or all of its citizens, based on political,
social, racial, religious, or cultural discrimination, or against the citizens of
a territory occupied or annexed by the said state, or those of neighboring
or distant countries. States usually avoid the terrorist label for acts com-
mitted by invoking the excuse of "self defense" (equivalent terms include
"security," "law and order" and, of course, the "fight against terrorism").
They tend to brand their political opponents as terrorists in order to avoid
political dialogue and as justification to crush any dissent. Hence the
importance of avoiding politically motivated abuse of the term to justify
state terrorism under the excuse of "fighting terrorism," by focusing on the
nature of the act itself.
In order to protect the sovereignty of states, international law has prac-
tically (but not theoretically) disregarded terrorism practiced by states.
Any follower of current events agrees that it is individuals and sub-national
groups that are the ones usually branded as terrorists. States are rarely
identified and condemned as terrorist states. They may harbor, encourage
or turn a blind-eye to terrorists on their soil, but rarely do we hear of a state
itself being condemned as terrorist. It is as if terrorism has become only
that which is used against the state, to the exclusion of that used by the
state.
And yet, as General Assembly Resolution 39/159 and 44/29 indicates,
international law openly and strongly condemns state terrorism. Among
"all acts, methods and practices of terrorism" that Resolution 44/29 con-
demns is state terrorism, and its highest form, occupation. Occupation is
a form of terrorism because it involves political violence against innocent
people. No international legal document distinguishes between state ter-
rorism and other types of terrorism. This is to avoid selective endorsement
and implementation of texts that condemn terrorism. And yet, on Decem-
ber 7, 1987, it was exactly this that took place, when only two states, the
U.S. and Israel, rejected General Assembly Resolution 42/159 which con-
demns occupation and upholds the right of peoples to self-determination
and the legitimacy of national liberation movements.
We are also witnessing a shift in international law, with the increasing
prevalence (theoretically) of international humanitarian law over state sov-
ereignty. Hitherto immune to the jurisdiction of international law, states
and heads of state are seeing their immunity increasingly limited, as illus-
trated by the trials of Slobodan Milosevic and Augusto Pinochet, as well as
the probable trial of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon for his responsibil-
ity in the massacre of Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee
camps in Lebanon.
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Clearly, it is when the state commits terrorist acts that the term "ter-
rorism" can become unclear, making it an easy political accusation, not a
firm legal term. State terrorism is dangerous because it breeds more vio-
lence, often making revolutionary terrorism inevitable, as state authorities
use terror to deny basic human rights to its own citizens or those under its
occupation, including their right to self-determination.
Combating terrorism does not take place with weapons alone, as long
as the anger among the oppressed persists. General Assembly Resolution
42/159 acknowledges that the cause of terrorism often lies in the "misery,
frustration, grievance and despair" that leads people to seek radical
change. The resolution identifies the root causes of terrorism as occupa-
tion, colonialism and racism. A definition of terrorism should thus be
comprehensive, in order to avoid double standards. It should encompass
all forms of the act, irrespective of the perpetrator, actor, target, place and
time. It should include state terrorism.
